Biography
Dr. Godden’s primary areas of research are epistemology and informal logic. Generally speaking, I study the normative dimensions of argumentation (understood as those practices by which we transact reasons with one another), and reasoning (our internalization of those practices whereby we transact reasons with ourselves). My interests in these activities are almost exclusively epistemological: the primary normative status I concern myself with is epistemic justification, which I understand in terms of other statuses like commitment, entitlement, and recognition. My approach to theorizing our discursive and epistemic norms is thoroughly dialectical. In this respect, my work remains significantly informed by the postdoctoral work I did with Douglas Walton. More recently, it is increasingly influenced by pragmatism, especially by the work of Robert Brandom. Presently, I have active, ongoing projects on the following topics: deep disagreements; presumption and burden of proof; disagreement and trust; adversariality and civility in public argumentative discourse; aretaic approaches to argumentative norms; formal models of argumentative dialogue. For example, here’s a link to a talk I gave a few years ago on disagreement and trust as part of MSU’s Center for Interdisciplinarity (C4I) University Interdisciplinary Colloquium (UIC): Talk poster / abstract ; Link to talk on YouTube: 2021 University Interdisciplinary Colloquium with Dr. David Godden
Notice to Prospective Graduate Students: I welcome the opportunity to work with new and current graduate students on projects that are in line with the research interests, approaches, and topics outlined above. I am especially interested in supervising graduate studies in those topical areas of my active, ongoing projects, mentioned earlier. While I have worked on argumentation schemes in the past, I am not interested in supervising projects seeking to provide a classificatory catalogue of argumentation schemes or seeking to provide an underlying theory of their typology. Previously, I have co-authored papers with graduate students (Davis & Godden, 2021) I have mentored. Generally, I am happy to engage in collaborative research projects with graduate students whether or not those projects feature in their dissertational plans. Interested students are encouraged to contact me directly by email in advance of their applying to the program. You can email me here: dgodden@msu.edu
Works
Godden, D. and Wells, S. (2022). Burdens of proposing: On the burden of proof in deliberation dialogues. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice 42(1): 291–342.
Godden, D. (2022). Getting out in front of the Owl of Minerva Problem. Argumentation:An International Journal on Reasoning 36: 35–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503–021–09554–2 Preview: https://rdcu.be/cwL6l
Godden, D. (2021). Epistemic autonomy, epistemic paternalism, and blindspots of reason. In G. Axtell and A. Bernal (Eds.), Epistemic paternalism: Conceptions, justifications, and implications (pp. 181–197) London: Rowman & Littlefield.
Godden, D. and Grey, J. (2021). Reasoning by grounded analogy. Synthese 199, 5419–5453. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229–020–02974–9 Preview: https://rdcu.be/cACtw
Godden, D. (2021). The compliment of rational opposition: Disagreement, adversariality, and disputation. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 40(5): 845–858. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245–021–09768–9 Preview: https://rdcu.be/czk97
Davis, J. and Godden, D. (2021). Adversarial listening in argumentation. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 40(5): 925–937. doi: 10.1007/s11245–020–09730–1 Preview: https://rdcu.be/cbvZV
Godden, D. and Casey, J. (2020). No place for compromise: Resisting the shift to negotiation. Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning, 34, 499–535. doi: 10.1007/s10503–020–09517–z Preview: https://rdcu.be/b3b7c
Godden, D. (2019). On the rational resolvability of deep disagreement through meta–argumentation: A resource audit. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 38, 725–750. doi: 10.1007/s11245–019–09682–1 Preview: https://rdcu.be/b9oKi
Godden, D. (2019). Corroboration: Sensitivity, safety, and explanation. Acta Analytica, 34(1),15–38. doi: 10.1007/s12136–018–0351–x Preview: https://rdcu.be/NHN8
Godden, D. (2019). Analyzing presumption as a modal qualifier. In H.V. Hansen, F. Kauffeld, J. Freeman, and L. Bermejo–Luque (Eds.), Presumptions and burdens of proof: An anthology (pp. 206–219). Tuscaloosa, AB: University of Alabama Press.
Godden, D. and Zenker, F. (2018). A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency. Synthese, 195, 1715–1740. doi: 10.1007/s11229–016–1299–2 Preview: http://rdcu.be/oejr
Godden, D. (2017). Presumption as a modal qualifier: Presumption, inference, and managing epistemic risk. Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning, 31, 485–511. doi: 10.1007/s10503–017–9422–1 Preview: http://rdcu.be/peze
Godden, D. (2017). On the norms of visual argument: A case for normative non– revisionism. Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning, 31, 395–431. doi: 10.1007/s10503–016–9411–9
Godden, D. (2017). Mill on logic. In C. Macleod and D.E. Miller (Eds.), A Companion to Mill (pp. 175–191). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Godden, D. (2016). On the priority of agent–based argumentative norms. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 35, 345–357. doi: 10.1007/s11245–014–9296–x
Godden, D. (2016). Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition. In F. Paglieri, L. Bonelli, and S. Felletti (Eds.), The psychology of argument: Cognitive approaches to argumentation and persuasion (pp. 67–83). Studies in Logic and Argumentation. London: College Publications.
Godden, D. (2015). Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice, 35, 135–166.
Godden, D. and Zenker, F. (2015). Denying antecedents and affirming consequents: The state of the art. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice, 35, 88–134.
Godden, D. (2014). Modeling corroborative evidence: Inference to the best explanation as counter–rebuttal. Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning, 28, 187–220.
Godden, D. (2014). Teaching rational entitlement and responsibility: A Socratic exercise. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice, Teaching Supplement, 34, 124–151.
Godden, D. (2014). Mill’s System of Logic. In W.J. Mander (Ed.), Oxford handbook of British philosophy in the nineteenth century (pp. 44–70). Oxford: Oxford UP.
Godden, D. (2012). Rethinking the debriefing paradigm: The rationality of belief perseverance. Logos & Episteme, 3, 51–74.
Godden, D. (2010). The importance of belief in argumentation: Belief, commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion. Synthese, 172, 397–414.
Godden, D. and Brenner, W. (2010). Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement. Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation, 2, 41–80.
Godden, D. (2010). Corroborative evidence. In C. Reed and C.W. Tindale (Eds.), Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation: An examination of Douglas Walton’s theories of reasoning and argument (pp. 201–212). London: College Publications
Godden, D. and Griffin, N. (2009). Psychologism and the development of Russell’s account of propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic, 30, 171–186.
Godden, D. (2008). On common knowledge and ad populum: Acceptance as grounds for acceptability. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 41, 101–129.
Godden, D. and Walton, D. (2007). A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation. Pragmatics & Cognition, 15, 313–346.
Godden, D. and Walton, D. (2007). Advances in the theory of argumentation schemes and critical questions. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice, 27, 267–292.
Walton, D. and Godden, D. (2007). Informal logic and the dialectical approach to argument. In H.V. Hansen and R.C. Pinto (Eds.), Reason reclaimed (pp. 3–17). Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
Godden, D. (2006). Departmental boundaries within the corporate body of theory: Quine on the holistic foundations of logic. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 45, 505–528.
Godden, D. (2005). Psychologism in the logic of John Stuart Mill: Mill on the subject matter and foundations of ratiocinative logic. History and Philosophy of Logic, 26, 115–143.
Godden, D. (2005). Deductivism as an interpretative strategy: A reply to Groarke’s defense of reconstructive deductivism. Argumentation and Advocacy: Journal of the American Forensic Association, 41, 168–183
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